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It is risky, for either author or reader,
to hold criticism responsible to the
current moment. This is a pitfall
largely avoided by both Joe Cleary’s recent Outrageous Fortune
and by Declan Kiberd’s Irish Classics, though for different
reasons. As Cleary says, the risk in the contemporary moment
is that ‘elation at overcoming a difficult history will serve only
to reduce the space for debate, and to consolidate new
orthodoxies as disabling as any that prevailed in the past’
(1/2). The sense that Cleary wrote this at the pinnacle of the
recent boom does not prevent us realising that the converse is
also true; pessimism in the context of financial crisis,
economic recession, a sterile politics and an academic and
intellectual sphere largely passive in the face of a hostile state
should not lead us to conclude that the present moment is one
without opportunities for criticism. The question is, how does
criticism respond to such openings?
Here is Cleary’s definition of the job of criticism:
The proper business of any critical theory is not to
validate a pregiven political position, whether to the
left or right. It is, rather, to track the matrix of
oppressive and emancipatory forces at work in every
period of modernity, and indeed to be attentive to how
even the most emancipatory developments can
sometimes collude with or be commandeered by the
regressive. (7)
Cleary offers a series of interpretative surveys of a variety
of Irish critical discourses / aesthetic ideology, the
historiography of the novel, naturalism, tragedy / whose great
power and usefulness lies precisely in their long-range
frameworks. Arguing that Irish literary/intellectual debate has
been dominated for the last couple of decades by the three
discourses of revisionism, feminism and postcolonialism,
Cleary points out that these modes nevertheless share a great
deal in common: the class background and professional
academic status of most of their adherents; their attitudes
to modernisation; their tendency to see themselves as
‘dissenting’; and their approach to the ‘politics’ of the text.
Cleary identifies
a widespread tendency to equate political engagement
and analysis with thematizing ‘the political’ in literary
or other cultural texts. Conceived thus, political
analysis in the cultural sphere essentially amounts to
producing new readings of cultural texts or artefacts
that foreground political or social themes. The
analytical idioms in such cases will undoubtedly be
very up-to-the-moment, but the actual practice
(whether in revisionist or postcolonialist or feminist or
in queer studies, and so on) will still remain broadly
consonant with the older modes of ‘ethical’ criticism
characteristic of the discipline of literary criticism at its
bourgeois meridian. Whether the object of analysis is a
high modernist literary text or popular film, a work of
visual art or music, the debate in such instances will
predictably be conducted mainly at the level of the
semiotic content of the text. (3/4)
Such criticism takes no interest in a sociology of culture or its
instrumentalities, no interest in the institutional or commercial
apparatuses by which culture is made, authorised,
disseminated, commodified; taught, reproduced, displayed as
symbolic capital; deployed by the machinery of the state or
great corporations. How these apparatuses or processes affect
criticism itself is even further off the map. Cleary admits that
his own book does not go far in this direction, though the form
of his essays marks a refreshing break from the focus on one
text or a handful of texts that characterises most Irish critical
essays.
Cleary concludes his opening essay by referring to Perry
Anderson’s reading of Francis Fukuyama. Anderson notes
Fukuyama’s rightwing triumphalism, yet accepts that the
capacity of the global Left to offer a political or economic
alternative to capitalism and liberal democracy is almost nil; in
Cleary’s pithy gloss, ‘capitalism’s difficulty is not necessarily
socialism’s opportunity’ (9). While the Marxist critique of
capitalism only becomes more relevant and useful, the
capacity of the Left to elaborate a political project that has not
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always already surrendered to the capture of the logic of
neoliberal modernisation becomes only weaker. The point is
not that alternatives to the status quo cannot be imagined; it
is rather that the alternatives on offer seem to be only slight
variations on the present. Cleary’s book seems to me to
dramatise a very particular moment and impulse. On the one
hand, Cleary offers one of the most brilliant and thoroughgoing
critiques of contemporary Irish culture we have. On the other,
he admits the political powerlessness of such criticism.
A much more optimistic view was offered by Declan Kiberd
in 2000 in his magisterial overview of Irish Classics. In the final
chapter, Kiberd responds to the Good Friday Agreement, and
sees a positive future for Irish criticism. Accepting that Irish
Studies has always been ‘a crisis-driven discipline’ (620),
Kiberd nevertheless sees positive, even utopian, possibilities
in it and its objects. Yet, he tells us, from the 1920s to the
1960s, English departments in Ireland worked mostly with
exercises in ‘ventriloquism’ (623). Criticism of Anglo-Irish
literature developed mostly outside of Ireland. Work which
sought to establish continuities between Gaelic Irish and
Anglophone Irish literature, such as Vivien Mercier’s The Irish
Comic Tradition (1962), were ambivalently received. For Kiberd,
the most notable critique of Mercier’s book came from Conor
Cruise O’Brien, who perceived an essentialism underlying the
continuities of Mercier’s historical narrative. O’Brien suggested
that the Irish ‘tradition’ was a more fragmentary formation,
imposed on the materials of culture for pragmatic reasons. The
situation was better described in terms which Kiberd calls
‘behaviourist’, but which have a materialist ring to them; ‘Irish
minds’, or mentalites, are responses to the ‘Irish predicament’
(625). From the Mercier/O’Brien debate, Kiberd traces a
bifurcated heritage of much contemporary Irish criticism, with
Seamus Deane leading the Mercians, and Edna Longley
leading the O’Brienites. But in the 1950s and 1960s Richard
Ellmann, for all his labours and critical sympathy, essentially
saw Irish literature as increasingly modern to the extent that it
sloughed off its Irishness or transcended its context. Kiberd
sees himself, of course, as arguing to the contrary. Modernity,
he says, has been the constitutive Irish experience. The
modernism of Irish literature has been coded into the Belfast
Agreement, he argues, placing it in a lineage dating back to
Charlotte Brooke’s Reliques of Irish Poetry. In the Agreement,
with its assumption of the re-writing of the 1937 Constitution
so as to drop the territorial claim, Kiberd discerns the final
emergence of a national culture, successfully flensed of
political nationalism:
Even as political nationalism disappears, a truly
comprehensive national culture may for the first time
be born. After all, political nationalism was just
another in the long line of attempts to cope with
modernity */ it was nothing more than a means by
which to implement the Celtic values of a people
which had never achieved a satisfactory embodiment
under the British imperial scheme. By attaching itself
to forms of the state inherited from British days and by
leaving those forms unmodified, it doomed itself to
frustration, to mistaking the means of liberation for the
end in itself. The Belfast Agreement at least gives
everyone the chance to start again. It may in time
produce political and cultural models that could be of
use to communities in other war-torn parts of the
world, where the problem of ‘blood and belonging’
cries out for cultural rather than military solutions. Its
central intuition / that an unprecedented knowledge is
possible in zones where cultures collide / would not
have fazed any of the major writers treated in this
book. The seeds of the Belfast Agreement were sown
in the works of Irish literature [ . . .]. (631)
One notes here Kiberd’s culturalist or idealist conviction that
the ideas embodied in Irish culture are the driving force of Irish
society. If in the middle 1990s he suggested that Irish writers
had invented the nation, now he is suggesting that that grand
narrative has dissolved itself at the level of the political, the
Belfast Agreement being the last text in that tradition. Irish
literature can now be ‘unblemished by Irishness, but securely
Irish’ (Deane 58). Other more glancing points show interesting
slippages. The Belfast Agreement now appears a positive form
of the Cultural Traditions programme, which asserts ‘parity of
esteem’ for rival ‘cultures’ in the North. Kiberd’s conclusion is
the assertion that the telos of the Irish literary tradition is the
Belfast Agreement. ‘The future is, as Oscar Wilde tells us, what
artists already are’, Kiberd argues (617), evoking Ernst Bloch’s
idea of ‘anticipatory illumination’ (Bloch 141/55 passim). It
would be inaccurate to suggest that Kiberd characterises the
Agreement as a utopian document, but it is striking to see a
critic willing to stake so much on the present moment.
II
Though both Cleary and Kiberd are identified with Irish
postcolonial criticism, they are evidently very different in both
method and mood, and in their attitudes to political criticism.
What is notable is that the critic whose work most overtly
displays its theoretico-political resources is also the one who
is most pessimistic politically. By this I do not simply mean
that Kiberd’s optimistic liberal republicanism bases its sense
of hope on an international treaty, while Cleary’s pessimistic
Marxism grounds its disillusion in the inevitability of a crisis-
racked capitalism. What is interesting also is the sense that
each has or embodies for criticism itself.
Cleary’s model is based on that of the Frankfurt School
thinkers. Its emphasis on ‘critical theory’, on the
contradictions of modernisation and on the potential for
domination in the midst of apparent liberalisation, all point
towards the disenchanted view of post-Enlightenment culture
summed up by Adorno and Horkheimer. This is a critical
heritage that ultimately dates back to the young Marx. For the
Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts, radical philosophy was
grounded in the social world; a philosophy that could not be
turned out to the world was not living up to its radical
intention. If the root of his philosophy was ‘man’, man’s
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primary characteristic was alienation. In the Eleventh Thesis on
Feuerbach, Marx famously suggested that earlier philosophers
had tried to understand the world; the real challenge is to
change it. This view was developed by mid-twentieth-century
Marxists, most notably Luka´cs, and then Marcuse and
Horkheimer. To the Frankfurt thinkers, bourgeois philosophy
was contemplative, but Critical Theory was to be active.
Bourgeois philosophy stands outside of the world of fixed
objects and structures which it gazes at; Critical Theory is
active */ the contemplative separation of subject and object
was to be broken by dialectical interaction which would make
change possible in both. In Dick Howard’s gloss,
Understanding the world is possible only through the
action which changes it; changing the world
transforms the subject whose philosophical
questioning of its conditions of possibility inaugurated
the critical dialectic that opens the path to radical
politics. (2)
Yet this activist rhetoric seems to belong more to Kiberd than
to Cleary. Kiberd is more evidently confident of the place of
criticism in the world. If Irish literature contains within itself
the seeds of the future, as Kiberd suggests, then the critic
whose task it is to provide the kind of reading which
elucidates that anticipatory illumination will never lack for a
role. Kiberd practises a Blochian historicism, which reads
backwards even as it narrates forwards in cultural history.
Such a Whiggish structure of intellectual feeling inevitably
justifies the social and political position of the critics who
enact it. With Cleary, by contrast, we get a pessimistic
narrative predicated fundamentally on the political limitations
of post-Revival ‘neo-naturalist’ aesthetics. Cleary’s work sits
unhappily at a point where the progressive Hegelianism
of Luka´cs and Jameson, at the level of critical method,
runs aground on the entropic Hegelianism of Koje`ve and
Fukuyama, at the level of the political. So resolute is Cleary’s
focus on neo-naturalism as a cultural dominant, so
pessimistic is he about the critical resources of late Irish
modernism or postmodernism, that even the last essay on the
Bachanalian carnival of the Pogues must conclude with a
cleverly Adornian formulation of the ‘integrity’ of their putative
‘failure’ (Cleary 226).
Paradoxically, allusions to ‘political criticism’ derive their
force from the fact that criticism takes place on the terrain of
civil society. With Jurgen Habermas and Reinhart Koselleck, in
fact, we can say that criticism is constitutive of civil society.
Civil society is itself a term open to debate and with a varied
semantic heritage. It is in the Philosophy of Right (1821),
however, that Hegel gives us the modern sense of the term.
Civil or bourgeois society, the realm of individuals who have
left the unified space of the family to enter into competitive
economic relations with each other, is to be contrasted with
the State. Hegel sees civil society as configured mostly by
private interests and economic activities. Yet he also sees civil
society as including various civic and social institutions which
organise and govern economic life, leading by a process of
education to the rational life of the state. The particularity of
civil life blends over into the universality of the state. For
Hegel, this is necessary as, unlike earlier thinkers, he sees no
inherent rationality in civil society.
With Marx, the meaning of civil society narrows
considerably. The term now refers chiefly to economic interests
and activities, crass egotism and materialism. Civil society
arose on the ruins of mediæval society, where individuals were
organised in guilds and estates, each of which possessed a
political role. As these organisations or partial societies broke
down, civil society arose as the space of atomised individuals,
linked only by the law. The broken and conflictual character of
civil society requires a politics which is abstracted from it. The
modern state is necessitated but also determined by these
characteristics of civil society. The political identity of
individuals as citizens in modern society is separated from
their civil identity, and from their work in the productive sphere
of economic relations, whether as bourgeois capitalist or as
wage-labourer: ‘The political revolution . . . abolished the
political character of civil society’ (Marx 232). Marx contrasts
the idealism of universal interests as represented in the state,
and the abstracted concept of a citizen who is moral because
he goes beyond his narrow interest, with the materialism of
the real sensuous in civil society:
But the perfection of the idealism of the state was at
the same time the perfection of the materialism of civil
society. The shaking-off of the political yoke was at the
same time the shaking-off of the bonds which had
held in check the egoistic spirit of civil society.
Political emancipation was at the same time the
emancipation of civil society from politics, from even
the appearance of a universal content. (233)
For the struggle of civil society to be ended, and for the full
potential of human beings to be realised, a revolution must
take place; civil society and the political society it helps to
produce must be set aside, and a social as well as political
revolution take place.
The major theorist of civil society in Marx’s wake was
Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci enacts a return to Hegel in his
formulations, which are broader and more positive than those
of Marx. To Gramsci, civil society is the home not merely of
individuals, but of organisations, and it is capable of rational
self-regulation and freedom. He picks up on Hegel’s sense that
the estates and corporations are organising elements which
represent corporate interests in a collective way, and equally
that the bureaucracy and legal system help to regulate civil
society and link it to the state. The separation of state and civil
society is analytically useful but not a practical reality. Even a
policy of non-interference is still formulated by a state. The
reality is the interpenetration of state and civil society; the
state is cushioned by hegemony organised and won in civil
society; the hegemony of the ruling class is backed by the
coercive power of the state. The state has an ‘ethical’ function,
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in that it tries to educate public opinion and intervene in the
economy; while custom and habit can exert a function through
civil society related or analogous to law. Though he argues
that state and civil society are deeply imbricated with each
other, Gramsci equally stresses that they are not identical to
each other. Recognising that the state has a role in the
development of civil society, Gramsci nevertheless is wary of
state-worship. Rather, in fact, he reformulates Marx’s idea of
the withering away of the state as the realisation of the self-
regulating capacity of civil society.
III
In Ireland, and in Northern Ireland specifically, thought and
work on culture and society issued in the 1980s in groups such
as those around the avant-garde journal The Crane Bag, and
later the Field Day Theatre Company, groups of which Declan
Kiberd was a member, and of which Joe Cleary is arguably a
legatee. However, neither The Crane Bag nor Field Day could
properly be understood as Marxist or Gramscian in their
formation. The Crane Bag’s main intellectual inspiration was
Heideggerian hermeneutics, and its governing metaphor was
that of the ‘fifth province’, an imaginary space where the
conflicts and difficulties besetting the four terrestrial and
historical provinces of Ireland could be resolved on the level of
ideas. Ireland’s problems were those of identitarian politics
and cultural ‘atavism’:
There must be a no-man’s land, a neutral ground
where things can detach themselves from all partisan
and prejudiced connection and display themselves as
they are in themselves . . . This province, this place,
this centre, is not a political position. In fact, if it is a
position at all, it would be marked by the absence of
any particular political and geographical delineation,
something more like a disposition. (Hederman and
Kearney 3/4)
Field Day was more politicised, but with the same idealist
emphasis. In 1984, Seamus Deane was arguing that the
Northern crisis was essentially ‘a crisis of language / the ways
in which we write it and the ways in which we read it’ (46). In a
1982 interview, Brian Friel had already suggested that the
Company aimed at figuring and creating ‘a cultural state, not a
political one’, out of which ‘a possibility of a political state
follows’ (O’Toole 21).
So the primacy of culture and criticism over the state and
political society is evident in both The Crane Bag and Field
Day. Both projects were confident that the realm of civil
society was the space from which the problems of political
society could be examined and resolved. Both The Crane Bag
and Field Day drew their contributors chiefly from academia,
but they operated outside of the academy. They operated,
nevertheless, with a sense of the relationship of culture and
the state that was more indebted to the Romantic idealism of
Friedrich Schiller than to the cultural materialism of Gramsci.
It was in his letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man that
Schiller argued that aesthetic pedagogy was an essential
prerequisite to the founding of a rational state. Confronting the
political turmoil of his own time, Schiller considers ‘that most
perfect of all the works to be achieved by the art of man: the
construction of true political freedom’ (7). Schiller’s ambition
in the letters is to establish the principle
that if man is ever to solve that problem of politics in
practice, he will have to approach it through the
problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through
Beauty that man makes his way to Freedom. (9)
The rational state can only be achieved once ‘the split within
man is . . . healed, and his nature so restored to wholeness
that it can itself become the artificer of the State’ (45).
It seems reasonable to suggest that this appears to be the
thinking that underlies the Field Day project. Both The Crane
Bag and Field Day showed little reflexive consciousness of
their own location on the terrain of civil society, while fully
confident in their ability to mould or even to reformulate the
terrain of the political. These groups had a Gramscian interest
in the role of intellectuals, but little of his sense of the
materiality or institutional imbrications of culture, or of its
relationship to the state, which were conceived more in
Romantic terms. One must acknowledge the boldness of both
The Crane Bag and the Field Day projects, which sought to
create a counter-public sphere by the sheer force of their work,
while also identifying their weaknesses. The cultural/civil was
deemed essential to the political, but the importance of the
political to the cultural/civil was neglected.
And this remains the case with both Kiberd and Cleary,
albeit with different inflections. Both writers are deeply
concerned with modernity, a crucial category for Irish criticism
and intellectual life over the last four decades. Kiberd wishes
to stress the modernity of Irish writers: ‘my contention is that,
for writers as disparate as O Bruadair and Yeats, to be Irish
was to be modern anyway, whether one liked it or not’ (628).
Modernity, for Kiberd, is firstly an attribute of individual
writers; his exemplary figures are ‘Tory anarchists’,
‘aristocratic radicals’, ‘protesting nostalgists’, Janus-faced
figures who combine in their work and in their performative
selves elements of past and present in the act of making an
anticipated future. Yet there is in Kiberd an elision between
the modernity of such writers, and modernity as a periodising
historiographic concept of the transition between a
‘traditional’ society and a ‘modern’ one. Exactly when this
‘modernity’ emerged or took place is never quite clear, but this
movement is held to be basically positive. Cleary is, in the
manner of Horkheimer and Adorno, more attuned to the
problematics and contradictions of modernity, but it is
nevertheless his remit; the task of a properly ‘critical theory’ is
to ‘track the matrix of oppressive and emancipatory forces at
work in every period of modernity’ (Cleary 7) */ in short, to
track the dialectic of enlightenment.
But criticism as we know it is itself a creature of
enlightenment and modernity, and its rise has been concurrent
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with that of the modern state. The very relationship of civil and
political society we traced through Hegel, Marx and Gramsci is
a primary characteristic of modernity. Critics such as Kiberd
and Cleary are very interested in modernity as a set of cultural
ideas and experiences, but pay less attention to modernity as
a set of socio-political institutions and structures, less still to
the relationship between modernity and the critical institution
itself. Whereas Habermas’s 1980 defence of modernity
characterises it as ‘an incomplete project’; glossing Weber, he
suggests that cultural modernity consists in ‘the separation of
the substantive reason expressed in religion and metaphysics
into three autonomous spheres’ (9). These spheres are art,
science and morality, which came to be differentiated as
unified religion and metaphysics collapsed. Furthermore,
Since the 18th century, the problems inherited from
these older world-views could be arranged so as to fall
under specific aspects of validity: truth, normative
rightness, authenticity and beauty. They could then be
handled as questions of knowledge, or of justice and
morality, or of taste. Scientific discourse, theories of
morality, jurisprudence, and the production and
criticism of art could in turn be institutionalised.
(Habermas 9)
The point here is that criticism and literary scholarship are
part of the rise of what Habermas calls ‘aesthetic-expressive
rationality’ and its institutionalisation. For Adorno and
Horkheimer, this would have meant that literary and aesthetic
pedagogy were themselves linked to the dialectics of
enlightenment. Critique itself, especially as it is
institutionalised in universities and academies, may be
part of the machinery of reification and domination.
It may be that the ‘proper business of any critical theory is
not to validate a pregiven political position, whether to the left
or right’ (Cleary 7), as Cleary says, but a critical theory also
needs to have a clear sense of where it lies on the terrain of
civil society, and that most of all when it wishes to make
interpretative claims on the terrain of the political. Cleary is
not explicit as to how he conceives of his own practice; for him
to be so, he would have to elaborate the critique of the
‘historical conditions of operation of the [cultural/intellectual]
field itself’ which he suggests is necessary for cultural change
(Cleary 137). This is a task which Outrageous Fortune, in spite
of its methodological self-consciousness, largely eschews, and
which Irish Classics confidently bypasses. It is hard to avoid
the sense that Cleary is unsure of the public to which his
project of critical negation is addressed; while Kiberd, writing
in a deliberately accessible register and publishing with a non-
academic house, is confident of his position in the public
sphere. Contrasting Cleary and Kiberd reveals the problems of
‘radical’ criticism in a wider setting characterised by the
capitalisation of culture, the disappearance of politics, the
attenuation of the public sphere and the absence of
institutionalised counter-cultural resources.
Simone Chambers, in a recent essay on the politics of
Critical Theory, suggests that Adorno and Horkheimer were
accused of having no politics on at least three grounds: firstly,
that they adopted no open party politics; secondly, that they
were chiefly concerned with the superstructural and the
cultural; and lastly, and perhaps most damningly, that their
pessimism itself disabled a positive politics. She defends
them to the extent that she notes that they continued to
theorise even in the darkest times, and that they continued to
maintain that the mere cultivation of interiority is to accede to
the world of commodification and domination. Chambers sees
in Adorno and Horkheimer, finally, a politics of ‘engaged
withdrawal’; a ‘Socratic enterprise of cranky admonishment
and moral dressing-down’ (223).
In 1927 Carl Schmitt had argued in The Concept of the
Political that modern bourgeois liberal politics is based on
compromise; hence, all its solutions are temporary,
contingent, never decisive. Further, on this basis, equality and
democracy are incompatible; the universalism of equality will
always challenge the legitimacy of liberalism, which rests on
discussion and shifting majorities. And further again,
liberalism undermines the political, to the extent that it
undermines struggle and replaces it with procedure. Thus,
legitimacy and legality are in contradiction to each other.
Schmitt strangely parallels Horkheimer and Adorno in
suggesting that, in modern liberal society, the political is
hidden or even erased. Matching the Frankfurt analysis of the
self-reification of intellect and society in the form of
bureaucratic rationality, Schmitt suggests that liberalism looks
for the fragmentation and de-politicisation of the full span of
human activities. Adorno and Horkheimer accept these
distinctions, and choose to work within them. Certainly, in
Schmittian terms, Adorno and Horkheimer have renounced the
political.
We find a proximate configuration of the range of
possibilities in radical Irish criticism. Cleary’s version of critical
theory / for all its admirable and welcome iconoclasm and
capacity for critical negation / does not openly advance the
minimal normative project of Horkheimer and Adorno. In
contrast, Kiberd’s work suggests that culture and criticism
help to produce the good */ an apparently depoliticised
universalised version of the good, though of course the
depoliticising manoeuvre is itself highly political. Embedded
within Kiberd’s criticism there seems to be a welcoming of the
‘end of history’ or the ‘end of ideology’; the implication is that
‘normal’ criticism can now resume its task, interrupted by
decades of low-level war and social strife. Neither project turns
back to examine the grounds of its own authority, yet one
notes that Kiberd’s criticism, in the Blochian act of anticipating
or even announcing the end of critical ‘politics’, makes the
more confident political move. In this alignment, we see the
homology between Irish criticism and the wider socio-political
system, a set of relationships which all Irish critics need to
consider as they ponder their future.
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